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The Social Bases of Political Cleavages in the  
Weimar Republic, 1919-1933 [1992] 
Jürgen W. Falter ∗ 
Abstract: »Soziale Basis politischer Konfliktlinien in der Weimarer Republik, 
1919-1933«. This article focuses on the divided and scattered political affilia-
tions in the Weimar Republic which helped to provide an environment that 
supported rapid political changes between 1919 and 1933. Using methodolo-
gies of historical electoral research, this article considers cleavages between 
party blocs on a federal level by analyzing the stability within and voter fluctu-
ation between political parties. These voter fluctuations are also analyzed by 
considering the social background of the eligible voters, as well as by religious 
denomination. An ecological regression analysis and aggregate data analysis 
determine the stability of voter blocs and note a number of reasons why the 
NSDAP received such a large number of votes from a rather stable voting sys-
tem in March of 1933.  
Keywords: Weimar Republic, political subcultures, political affiliations. 
 
The research project that constitutes the basis of this essay proceeds from the 
assumption that because of distinct handicaps in Germany’s political develop-
ment there was “neither a homogeneous nor a dominant political culture” in the 
Weimar Republic1 but rather – and this is particularly true for the period after 
1928 – an extraordinarily “fateful fragmentation [of the political system] into a 
multiplicity of political subcultures.”2 The inability of these subcultures either 
to interact with each other or to establish social and political hegemony, in turn, 
contributed in no small measure to the rise of National Socialism. This essay 
uses the methodologies of historical electoral research to investigate the elec-
toral strength of the most important of these political subcultures and to deter-
mine the changes that took place in their composition between 1919 and 1933. 
                                                             
∗  Reprint of: Falter, Jürgen W. 1992. The Social Bases of Political Cleavages in the Weimar 
Republic, 1919-1933. In Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Germany, ed. Larry E. 
Jones and James Retallack, 371-97. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
1  Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle, “Identitäts- und Konsensprobleme einer fragmentierten 
Gesellschaft. Zur Politischen Kultur der Weimarer Republik,” in D. Berg-Schlosser and J. 
Schissler, eds., Politische Kultur in Deutschland. Bilanz und Perspektiven der Forschung (Op-
laden, 1987), 83. 
2  Idem, in idem, eds., Politische Identität und nationale Gedenktage. Zur politischen Kultur der 
Weimarer Republik (Opladen, 1989), 15. 
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It is first necessary to clarify certain assumptions regarding use of the term 
“political subculture.” In terms of the project as a whole, this concept has been 
used rather loosely. Together with the conceptually related, though not neces-
sarily coterminous, notions of “political milieu” and “political camp,” the con-
cept of “political subculture” is replete with variations and nuances. For the 
purposes of this investigation, the term refers to “groupings beneath the nation-
al level that on the basis of different factors (such as social structure, material 
interests, socialization, confessional identity, regional origin, etc.) display 
consistent orientations, articulate positions, and pursue courses of action with 
respect to central political questions and in common social life and can thus be 
identified in the political sphere as a collective.”3 
This use of the term “political subculture” makes it possible to combine it 
with several closely related, though by no means theoretically equivalent, ex-
planatory concepts of historical electoral research. The term “political camp,” 
for example, can be used in conjunction with Walter Dean Burnham’s theory of 
political confessionalism to explain the varying degrees of susceptibility that 
adherents of the various Weimar parties displayed toward National Socialism 
and to distinguish between (1) a Marxist camp consisting of the Social Demo-
crats, the Independent Socialists, and the Communists, (2) a Catholic camp 
consisting of the Bavarian People’s Party (BVP) and the Center Party, (3) the 
camp of nonvoters, and (4) the ideologically fragmented bourgeois-Protestant 
camp with its plethora of individual political parties.4 Whereas the Marxist and 
Catholic camps are both characterized by comprehensive world views that 
shape the behavior of their adherents and by the effective social integration of 
their members into a wide range of voluntary associations in the pre-political 
sphere, this cannot be said, according to Burnham, of the liberal, conservative, 
and interest-oriented bourgeois-Protestant parties. Like all attempts at historical 
typology, however, this approach forces the living and ideologically variegated 
kaleidoscope of Weimar party politics into a procrustean bed of fixed, over-
simplified categories that can be justified only because they supposedly lead to 
a better understanding of the Nazis’ rise to power. 
These camps – with the exception of that of the nonvoters, which was a 
conglomerate of the most diverse social groups – were organized along socio-
political cleavages of profound secular importance. Borrowing from Seymour 
Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Franz Urban Pappi explains this as “the per-
sistent potentials for conflict between the social-structural groupings of a socie-
ty which, on account of its politicization, find expression in the electoral behav-
                                                             
3  Ibid., 3. 
4  See Walter Dean Burnham, “Political Immunization and Political Confessionalism: The 
United States and Weimar Germany,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 3 (1972): 1-30. 
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ior of these groupings.”5 In this respect, it is possible to distinguish between 
two fundamental types of conflict that arose in connection with the national and 
industrial revolutions. The first of these expresses itself in conflicts over ethnic, 
territorial, and cultural questions; the second in conflicts of a social-economic 
and structural nature. Among the former are conflicts between established 
churches and the government or between dominant and subordinate cultures, 
whereas the latter types of conflict include those between the agricultural and 
industrial economic sectors or between workers and employers.6 
During the Second Empire, when the socio-politically defined conflicts took 
place primarily at the local or regional level, these cleavages appear to have 
established themselves first and foremost, though not exclusively, in what M. 
Rainer Lepsius has called a “social-moral milieu.” To Lepsius, the term “socio-
moral milieu” refers to locally or regionally limited social entities “that are 
formed by the convergence of several structural dimensions such as religion, 
regional tradition, economic situation, cultural orientation, or stratum-specific 
composition of the intermediary groups.”7 According to this view, parties con-
stitute themselves as the political action committees of the different milieus. 
For the Second Empire and the Weimar Republic, Lepsius distinguishes be-
tween (1) the socialist worker and artisan milieu that was characterized, at least 
during the Second Empire, by the “negative integration of the working-class 
into a subculture” and that was “tied to specific class interests”; (2) the Catho-
lic social milieu, which also constituted itself as a “political-social entity” ac-
cording to the principle of negative integration; (3) the conservative milieu, 
with two distinct dimensions – the feudal-agrarian and the governmental-
bourgeois – united by Protestantism; and (4) the bourgeois-Protestant milieu, 
which during the course of the Second Empire found itself reduced more and 
more “to a Mittelstand with a specific petty-bourgeois social morality.” For the 
most part, the four politically dominant social milieus were sharply separated 
from one another “by symbolically dramatized moral cleavages.”8 
How do these three theoretical concepts relate to one another? And what 
sort of contribution do they have to make to the solution of our research prob-
lem? All of them share the analysis of the relationship between social structure 
                                                             
5  Franz Urban Pappi, “Die konfessionell-religiöse Konfliktlinie in der deutschen Wählerschaft: 
Entstehung, Stabilität und Wandel,” in Dieter Oberndorfer, Hans Rattinger, and Karl Schmitt, 
eds., Wirtschaftlicher Wandel, religiöser Wandel und Wertwandel. Folgen für das politische 
Verhalten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin, 1985), 264. 
6  See Franz Urban Pappi, “Sozialstruktur und politische Konflikte in der Bundesrepublik. 
Individual- und Kontextanalysen der Wahlentscheidung” (unpub. Habilitation thesis, Univer-
sity of Cologne, 1976), 85ff. 
7  M. Rainer Lepsius, “Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur. Zum Problem der Demokratisierung 
der deutschen Gesellschaft,” in W. Abel et al., eds., Wirtschaft, Geschichte und Wirtschafts-
geschichte. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von F. Lütge (Stuttgart, 1966), 383. 
8  See M. Rainer Lepsius, Extremer Nationalismus. Strukturbedingungen vor der nationalsozia-
listischen Machtergreifung (Stuttgart, 1966), 27ff. 
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and party system as a common point of departure. Burnham’s notion of politi-
cal camps and electoral coalitions, Lipset and Rokkan’s theory of political 
cleavages, and Lepsius’s concept of the social-moral milieu are all based upon 
what Pappi has called a “politicized social structure.” But although neither the 
notion of the political camp nor that of political cleavage necessarily includes a 
territorial element in its definition – these can appear and function at the local 
as well as the national level – the concept of milieu implies the existence of a 
“great density of informal social relationships capable of providing the respec-
tive social group with a sense of common identity” that, for the most part, can 
be found only in a local or, at best, regional context.9 The norms of the milieu 
are thus reproduced through direct social interaction, and the behavioral uni-
formity of political camps and cleavage groups may result from individual 
identification with the political goals and behavioral norms of specific refer-
ence groups in a way that, due to the absence of an existing opportunity struc-
ture, does not automatically entail the individual’s daily, informal interaction 
with other members of that group. Using Burnham’s notion of the political 
camp or the Lipset-Rokkan theory of political cleavage, it is thus possible to 
argue that the voting propensities of “diaspora Catholics” or workers living 
outside the typical proletarian milieu, will, in turn, resemble those of the men 
and women residing in Catholic strongholds or working-class neighborhoods.10 
The concept of a social-moral milieu represents a theoretical improvement 
upon those two conceptions only in the event that the adherents of a particular 
milieu either possess an above-average, across-the-board probability of voting 
for the party of that specific milieu or at least manifest a distinctive and persis-
tent pattern of voting behavior, such as a lesser tendency to switch parties. 
From a statistical point of view, the first of these two requirements means that 
the postulated effect of the milieu works not only cumulatively – that is, it does 
not reflect the accumulation of behavioral characteristics associated with mem-
bership in the milieu – but also involves a supplementary contextual and there-
fore multiplicatory factor.11 Otherwise, the concept of the social-moral milieu 
would, from the perspective of electoral history, be no more than a label for the 
local concentration of certain social characteristics that one could no doubt 
identify but that are inconsequential as determinants of electoral behavior. 
These concepts contribute to determining the strength and persistence of politi-
cal subcultures in two ways. First, they offer different concept-specific perspec-
tives of classification for the categorization of political subcultures. Second, 
                                                             
9  Pappi, “Sozialstruktur und politische Konflikte,” 617. 
10  A quotation may elucidate this point: “Persons who find themselves in the same class situa-
tion can choose the same party on the basis of individual interests without the existence of 
grouping influence.” See Pappi, “Sozialstruktur und politische Konflikte,” 500. 
11  The operational consequences of the second requirement are obvious. 
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they explicitly incorporate the sociostructural and sociocultural basis of subcul-
tures into the analysis of political and electoral behavior. 
The following empirical investigation focuses upon (1) the socialist labor 
movement in its two principal manifestations, (2) the Catholic camp, (3) the 
bourgeois voter coalition identified here as “liberal-minded” that was important 
at least at the beginning of the Weimar Republic, and (4) the initially predomi-
nantly rural but later increasingly urban German Nationalist electoral bloc, as 
well as (5) the National Socialists, whose growth after 1928 came, in the opin-
ion of most observers, at the expense of the latter two electoral groups.12 In this 
connection, the term “camp,” or Lager, refers exclusively to political constella-
tions on the party and voter levels, without explicit reference to the underlying 
socio-structural and sociocultural voter coalitions. This essay employs ecologi-
cal regression analysis to investigate fluctuations both between and within the 
individual subcultures in spite of possible stability on the part of the blocs 
themselves. Relying in large part upon the typology proposed by Burnham, this 
essay then addresses the structural cleavages – or, better said, the socio-
structural correlates of the various political subcultures – whose social compo-
sition is determined with the help of ecological regression analysis. 
Continuities and Discontinuities at the National Level 
During the Weimar Republic, there was a striking discrepancy between the 
proliferation of political parties and voter volatility, on the one hand, and a 
remarkable stability of individual electoral blocs, on the other. This stability 
could be seen as early as 1919, when these electoral blocs emerged relatively 
intact from military defeat, revolution, the humiliation of Versailles, and pro-
found changes in both the franchise and the electoral system. What this sug-
gests is that the Weimar electorate, in spite of the enormous volatility of elec-
toral behavior, oriented itself, at least on the aggregate level, by socially and 
confessionally determined cleavages among the various party blocs. In the 
1919 elections to the National Assembly, for example, parties belonging to the 
bourgeois-Protestant bloc were unable to sustain the position they had achieved 
in the 1912 Reichstag elections, whereas those that belonged to the political left 
managed to gain a substantial number of votes. This situation, however, lasted 
only until 1920, when the old balance of power among the three party blocs 
was reestablished in the first postwar Reichstag election. No substantial change 
in this distribution of votes was to occur prior to 1933. 
                                                             
12  The introduction of additional concepts such as electoral groups or electoral blocs comes 
about not through compulsive originality but rather in order not to assume theoretical def-
initions that should not be addressed here. 
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Just as party blocs remained stable in the transition from the Second Empire 
to the Weimar Republic, so did the individual parties. The 1919 elections re-
flected both a shift from national liberalism to left liberalism and heavy losses 
for the conservative groups, which had coalesced in one right-wing catchall 
party, the German National People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei or 
DNVP). All of this, however, proved to be more or less transitory. By 1920 
political conservatism had recaptured the position it had held in 1912, as first 
the political left and then the bourgeois-Protestant electoral bloc began to split 
their votes among numerous parties in a tendency that was to become even 
more pronounced over the course of the next several years before making the 
Weimar Republic ultimately ungovernable. In the meantime, the so-called 
Weimar Coalition consisting of the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemo-
kratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD), the left-liberal German Democratic 
Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei or DDP), and the Catholic Center Party 
(Deutsche Zentrumspartei) had lost its electoral and parliamentary majority, 
whereas the political groups that opposed the Weimar Republic had already 
gained a slight majority. After July 1932, the extremist parties of the left and 
right, which were not merely opponents but bitter enemies of the Weimar Re-
public, possessed a majority in terms of both the popular vote and the seats 
they held in the Reichstag. This development left the parties of the Weimar 
Coalition with no alternative but to form extremely weak minority cabinets or 
to coalesce with groups that were not loyal supporters of the Weimar Republic 
for the entire period from the middle of 1920 to the collapse of parliamentary 
government at the beginning of the 1930s. 
The development of the bourgeois-Protestant bloc was characterized by the 
steady decline of the two liberal parties until they virtually disappeared on the 
electoral level, first through the emergence and temporary success of diverse 
special interest parties that also played a major role in the decline of the DNVP 
and then, after 1928, through the meteoric rise of the NSDAP. On the left, 
extremist parties established themselves as serious rivals to the more moderate 
Social Democrats very early in the history of the Weimar Republic. In 1920 the 
extremist forces on the left were represented by the Independent Social Demo-
cratic Party (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or USPD) 
and in 1932 by the Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands or 
KPD), which at different points in the Weimar Republic succeeded in mobiliz-
ing nearly half of the leftist electorate. This, in turn, severely limited the politi-
cal maneuverability of the Social Democrats throughout the Weimar Republic. 
Of the major electoral blocs that existed in the Weimar Republic, only the 
Catholic bloc experienced almost no significant shifts in power between the 
two main parties that formed it – the Center and the Bavarian People’s Party 
(Bayerische Volkspartei or BVP) – in spite of occasional efforts on the part of 
dissident Catholic groups to break off and form their own parties (Table 1). For 
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all intents and purposes, the changes in party affiliation were much stronger 
within the bourgeois-Protestant bloc than within the left or the Catholic bloc.  
In light of these shifts of strength within the bourgeois-Protestant bloc, most 
contemporary observers were convinced that the NSDAP’s dramatic gains at 
the polls came both from predominantly middle-class adherents of the bour-
geois-Protestant parties and from persons who had previously not voted or had 
just become eligible to vote for the first time. Followers of the two socialist 
parties and the Catholic bloc, on the other hand, were thought to be almost 
totally immune to Nazi electoral propaganda. In our discussion of Table 2, we 
will see that these conclusions may be valid as far as general tendencies are 
concerned but have to be modified considerably in the light of more recent 
empirical research. 
In the aggregate, the socialist and Catholic blocs remained remarkably stable 
between 1920 and 1933. Throughout the history of the Weimar Republic, the 
SPD mobilized between 16 and 23 percent of the German electorate, and the 
Center and BVP received between 11 and 14 percent of the eligible voters. By 
contrast, the fluctuations in the level of support for the KPD – and here, for 
purposes of simplicity, we are including the USPD – were much greater, rang-
ing from 7 to 15 percent. The same was true for the DNVP, which showed 
fluctuation between 5 and 16 percent, and most markedly for the two liberal 
parties, which fell from 17 to 2 percent. 
Table 1: The Electorate of the Weimar Parties, 1919-33 (Percentage of Eligible 
Voters)  
 Jan. 1919 
June 
1920 
May 
1924 
Dec. 
1924 
May 
1928 
Sept. 
1930 
July 
1932 
Nov. 
1932 
March 
1933 
KPD -  1.6  9.6  7.0  7.9 11.5 12.2 13.5 10.8 
USPD  6.3 14.0  0.6  0.3  0.1  0.0 - - - 
SPD 31.3 17.0 15.7 20.2 22.2 20.0 18.0 16.3 16.1 
DDP 15.5  6.5  4.3  4.9  3.7  3.1  0.8  0.8  0.8 
CENTER 13.2 10.7 10.2 10.6  9.0  9.6 10.4 9.5  9.9 
BVP  3.1  3.3  2.5  2.9  2.3  2.5  3.1  2.7  2.4 
DVP  3.7 10.9  7.0  7.8  6.5  3.9  1.0  1.5  1.0 
DNVP  8.5 11.8 14.8 15.9 10.9  5.7  5.2  7.1  7.0 
NSDAP - -  5.0  2.3  2.0 14.9 31.2 26.5 38.7 
OTHER  1.3  2.6  6.6  5.8 10.4 11.1  1.7  2.1  1.4 
Turnout 83.0 79.2 77.4 78.8 75.6 82.0 84.1 80.6 88.8 
KPD Communist Party 
USPD Independent Socialist Party 
SPD Social Democratic Party 
DDP German Democratic Party (left liberal) 
CENTER Catholic Center Party 
BVP Bavarian People’s Party (Catholic) 
DVP German People’s Party (national liberal) 
DNVP German Nation People’s Party (right wing, nationalistic) 
OTHER All other parties combined 
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Reconstructing the “Real“ Gains and Losses of the Political 
Blocs Between 1920 and 1933 
The preceding section outlined the net fluctuations between the different politi-
cal camps. These fluctuations reveal a general swing behind which significant-
ly greater subterranean shifts in voting behavior are sometimes concealed. 
Since each election result reflects the gains and losses of the various parties 
within each bloc, it might in an extreme case be possible for two equally strong 
parties to exchange their electorates completely without this ever showing up in 
the final vote. Survey data show that even in the case of sharp electoral shifts 
the fluctuations between two parties are often reciprocal, though occasionally 
strongly asymmetric. This suggests not only a flow of voters from the losing to 
the winning party but also a much smaller flow in the opposite direction. It is 
extremely improbable that voter fluctuations were different during the Weimar 
Republic. Unfortunately, this aspect of voter fluctuations has been overlooked 
by most historical accounts of Weimar elections. 
The following analysis therefore attempts, as a first step, to reconstruct the 
real voter movement between the different political subcultures. This recon-
struction is based on estimates obtained by a method known as “ecological 
regression analysis.” If and only if the relatively strict assumptions of this 
technique are met by the data will the estimates represent a true measure of the 
voter movement that actually occurred. If the data cannot satisfy these assump-
tions, they may still be regarded as the statistically best indicators of the voter 
exchange that took place between the individual subcultures and parties.13 
  
                                                             
13  To my knowledge, the statistical technique of ecological regression analysis was first devel-
oped by the German statistician F. Bernstein as early as 1932, but his work has escaped the 
attention of most empirical researchers. The instrument was subsequently rediscovered by 
Leo Goodman in his article “Ecological Regressions and Behavior of Individuals,” American 
Sociological Review 43 (1953): 557-72. The results or estimates displayed in Table 2 were 
calculated on the basis of a certain modification of this technique developed by Jan-Bernd 
Lohmöller that tries to cope with the effect of so-called contextual variables. See Jan-Bernd 
Lohmöller, Jürgen W. Falter, Andreas Link, and Johann de Rijke, “Unemployment and the 
Rise of National Socialism: Contradicting Results from Different Regional Aggregations,” in 
Peter Nijkamp, ed., Measuring the Unmeasurable (Dordrecht, Boston and Lancaster, 1985), 
357-70. Unfortunately we are not able to determine from the available data if all the con-
ditions of ecological regression analysis have been adequately satisfied. Furthermore, this 
technique is very sensitive to differing model specifications. Its results, therefore, should be 
interpreted quite cautiously and restricted to differences of magnitude, not to small per-
centage variations. Even then, the results should approximate what actually happened, since 
different model specifications and various multiple ecological regression analyses based on 
different aggregations produce approximately the same results, which in turn closely coin-
cide in magnitude with normal multiple regression analyses using so-called change varia-
bles. 
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Table 2: Voter Fluctuations between Political Subcultures and Parties  
Reichstag Election 20-24A 24A-B 24B-28 28-30 30-32A 32A-B 32B-33 x  
(a) Stability Rates for Each Pair of Electionsa 
SPD/KPD 40 66 72 65 61 67 71 63 
CENTER/BVP 50 70 55 66 65 63 74 63 
DDP/DVP 30 66 45 31  6 15 12 29 
DNVP 48 70 51 27 20 49 49 45 
OTHERb 13 40 29 47  9 22 11 24 
Bourgeoisc 25 60 44 35 11 34 33 35 
(b) Between Camp Voter Fluctuationsa 
Socialist Camp 39 19 18 22 22 18 19 22 
Catholic Camp 33 20 32 30 30 28 20 28 
Bourgeois-Protest. 34 17 25 41 66 37 51 39 
Bourgeoisd 34 16 23 19 19 17  9 20 
Nonvoters 42 43 22 50 43 19 59 40 
(c) Voter Fluctuation to and from the NSDAP 
Column 1: From other Party to NSDAP; Column 2: From NSDAP to other Party 
SPD/KPD 13:0  4:20 3:22 15:21 21:4 10:8 15:3 16:9 
CENTER/BVP  1:0  2:18 2:12 9:9 10:4  6:4 3:1  7:5 
DDP/DVP  7:0 3:9 3:11 26:5 36:1  4:1 23:1 22:2 
DNVP  8:0 2:29 1:10 31:3 33:5  0:3 34:3 25:4 
OTHERb  7:0 3:7 3:18 11:13 49:0 11:1 33:0 26:4 
Nonvoters  3:0 1:7 2:22 14:11 19:0  2:6 42:2 19:5 
Bourgeois-Protestant 
Camp     23:7 41:2 4:2 32:3 
(d) Net Fluctuations to the NSDAP (in percentage of total electorate) ∑ 
SPD/KPD  .71 -.65 -.10 2.18 3.10 -.92 1.32 5.64 
CENTER/BVP  .60 -.19 -.02  .90  .70 -.40  .12 1.71 
DDP/DVP 1.26 -.44   .12 2.50 2.37 -.25  .19 5.75 
DNVP 1.00 -.96   .02 3.35 1.23 -.93 1.57 5.28 
OTHERb  .90 -.22 -.12   .96 5.40   .02  .99 7.93 
Nonvoters  .53 -.14   .06 3.42 3.36 -1.52 7.68 13.57 
Transition probabilities estimated by means of multiple ecological regression analysis; commu-
nity-level data (1920-1930); county-level data (1930-1933). The data is from Jürgen W. Falter 
and Reinhard Zintl, “The Economic Crisis of the 1930s and the Nazi Vote,” Journal of Interdis-
ciplinary History 19 (1987/88): 55-85. 
a Percentage of first election voters of respective party. 
b Without NSDAP. 
c DDP, DVP, DNVP and OTHER (without NSDAP). 
d With NSDAP. 
 
Table 2a reports the retention rate of the different political subcultures. This 
retention rate is the percentage of those in each political camp or subculture 
who voted in any two consecutive elections either for the same party or for 
another party belonging to the same bloc. It is no surprise that the socialist and 
Catholic blocs reflect the highest retention rates. From one election to the next, 
they managed to retain an average of two-thirds of their voters, a figure that is 
somewhat lower than that for the major parties of the Federal Republic. In 
contrast, the bourgeois-Protestant bloc had a relatively low retention rate for 
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the period after 1924. On average, only about one-third of those who belonged 
to the bourgeois-Protestant bloc voted for parties that represented this bloc in 
consecutive elections. As early as 1924, there was a clear decline in the reten-
tion rate within this bloc, with a second wave of defections discernible between 
September 1930 and July 1932. Within this group, the retention rates were 
especially low for the liberal parties and for the various special interest and 
regional parties. Despite noticeable fluctuations, the DNVP was able to retain a 
significantly larger share of its electorate between 1928 and July 1932 than the 
other parties of the bourgeois-Protestant bloc. 
Table 2b displays the complementary phenomenon of shifts from one bloc 
to another. The socialist bloc showed the lowest rate of voter movement to 
other political blocs, followed closely by the Catholic bloc. If the NSDAP, 
however, is included in the bourgeois-Protestant bloc, as Burnham has suggest-
ed, the rate of voter movement away from this bloc is the lowest. In fact, Table 
2c indicates that voter shifts between the liberals and the conservatives as well 
as other political blocs, on the one hand, and the NSDAP, on the other, are 
clear and indisputable. In July 1932, for example, over 40 percent of the voters 
who had supported bourgeois-Protestant parties in 1930 switched to the 
NSDAP, whereas only 2 percent of those who had voted for the NSDAP in 
1930 supported other bourgeois-Protestant parties in July 1932. 
Voter movement to the NSDAP, however, was not restricted to supporters 
of the bourgeois-Protestant bloc. There were also other strongly asymmetrical 
voter shifts between the other political blocs and the NSDAP after 1928. An 
analysis of net fluctuations to the NSDAP is provided in Table 2d. This table 
reveals not merely the relative but, more important, the absolute contributions 
of the individual subcultures to the electoral surge of the NSDAP. In looking at 
all consecutive elections in the Weimar Republic, it becomes clear that nonvot-
ers, or those who had not taken part in the previous election, contributed by far 
the largest share of votes flowing to the Hitler movement, with almost 14 per-
cent of the Nazi vote coming from this source. This phenomenon can be ex-
plained in large part as a consequence of the enormous mobilization of prior 
nonvoters for the NSDAP in the election of March 1933, the first after Hitler 
became chancellor. Former voters for the various special-interest and regional 
parties in the bourgeois-Protestant bloc were another particularly important 
source of Nazi electoral support. Even more surprising, however, is the fact 
that net voter fluctuation from the socialist bloc to the NSDAP was virtually as 
high in absolute numbers as that from the two liberal parties or the DNVP. Of 
course, this is attributable to the fact that the KPD and SPD together attracted 
many more voters than the two Catholic parties, the two liberal parties, or the 
Nationalists. Elsewhere I have shown that it was primarily former SPD voters 
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who flocked from the socialist bloc to the NSDAP after 1928.14 By far the 
smallest net voter fluctuation to the NSDAP was manifested by the Catholic 
bloc. 
For the most part, then, voters tended to switch parties within a given politi-
cal bloc rather than move from one bloc to another. For the socialist and Catho-
lic blocs, shifts within these blocs were about three times more prevalent than 
shifts from one bloc to another. One must, however, consider that, for Catholic 
voters, moving from one party to another implied a true change of political 
ideology or affiliation, whereas socialist voters could switch to ideologically 
neighboring or related parties with much greater ease. If one includes the 
NSDAP with the bourgeois-Protestant bloc, the same pattern holds true for this 
political bloc, namely, that switches within the bloc were much more frequent 
than moves from it to another bloc. If, however, one excludes the NSDAP from 
this bloc, as some historians have done, the evidence then shows that shortly 
after 1924 the two liberal parties had been almost totally decimated and the 
nationalist-conservative party, the DNVP, partly so by the defection of their 
supporters to the new catchall party of the bourgeois-Protestant bloc, the 
NSDAP. From the purely electoral perspective, it was the fragmentation of the 
bourgeois-Protestant bloc and the lack of an explicit, socially sanctioned voting 
norm that promoted the rise of National Socialism. In this regard, Burnham’s 
theory of “political confessionalism” can be empirically verified by our data. 
The Social Foundations of the Weimar Party System 
The political parties of the Weimar Republic were organized along cleavages 
that had been inherited from the Second Empire, if not earlier. These cleavages 
can best be described, as Arthur Stinchcombe has suggested, as lines of tension 
separating the different coalitions between party elites and specific social 
groups.15 The existence of such cleavages can be established only if four condi-
tions are met: first, the persistence of party organizations, particularly at the 
local level; second, recruitment of the same core electorate over an extended 
period of time; third, the existence of party-specific social value orientations 
                                                             
14  Jürgen W. Falter and Dirk Hänisch, “Die Anfälligkeit von Arbeitern gegenüber der NSDAP bei 
den Reichstagswahlen 1928 und 1933,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 26 (1986): 179-216, Re-
print in this HSR Supplement. 
15  Arthur Stinchcombe, “Social Structure and Politics,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. 
Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3, Macropolitics (Reading, Mass., 1975), 557-
620. 
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within the electorate; and last, continuity over time as far as the programs of 
the various political parties are concerned.16 
For the Weimar Republic, it can be established that conditions one and four 
were met in spite of the fact that during the last years before 1933 almost all 
bourgeois-Protestant parties made significant changes in their party programs. 
Condition three cannot be analyzed by means of quantitative electoral analysis. 
Hence, this section concentrates on the issue of whether the political blocs in 
question were always able to mobilize the same core of voters or whether there 
were any important changes in the social composition of party electorates dur-
ing the Weimar Republic. 
In measuring the stability of political divisions, this section takes a close 
look at the stability of the denominational and class composition of party elec-
torates between 1920 and 1933. Because of the inherent limitations of analyses 
based upon aggregate data, a two-step procedure is employed. First, we exam-
ine the social correlates of the political parties over time (Table 3). Then we 
utilize ecological regression analyses to determine the voting behavior of spe-
cific social classes and religious denominations (Tables 4 and 5). Although 
there are certain dramatic changes of magnitude, this analysis reveals almost no 
significant shifts in the socio-structural bases of the various political parties and 
blocs between 1920 and 1933. 
Social Correlates and the Main Political Parties 
Table 3 presents the statistical association between selected social characteris-
tics and the voting results of the various parties in the form of correlation coef-
ficients. These coefficients range from +1.0 (which indicates a perfectly posi-
tive linear relationship between two variables) to – 1.0 (which represents a 
perfectly negative linear relationship between two variables). A relatively high 
coefficient, such as that between the share of blue-collar workers in the elec-
torate and the KPD vote share after 1920, represents a strong statistical rela-
tionship between the two variables. This relationship must then be interpreted 
in the following way: During the Weimar Republic, on average, the percentage 
of the KPD vote tended to be higher when the share of blue-collar workers in 
the counties and cities was larger; conversely, the lower the percentage of blue-
collar workers, the smaller the electoral chances of the KPD. An example of a 
negative correlation coefficient, on the other hand, is the fact that where the 
percentage of Catholics is higher, the SPD’s share of the popular vote is corre-
spondingly lower. Coefficients close to zero – all coefficients between +/− 0.10 
                                                             
16  See Franz Urban Pappi, “Sozialstruktur, Gesellschaftliche Wertorientierungen und Wahlab-
sicht. Ergebnisse eines Zeitvergleichs des Deutschen Elektorats 1953 und 1976,” Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift 18 (1977): 196ff. 
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are considered close to zero – should be interpreted as statistical nonassocia-
tions. This is the case, for example, for the relationship between the percentage 
of blue-collar workers and the DVP vote. Even correlation coefficients ranging 
from +/− 0.10 to +/− 0.20 represent at best very small, substantially insignifi-
cant statistical associations. They should, therefore, be interpreted with great 
caution. 
Table 3: Some Social Correlates of the Weimar Parties (Person’s r x 100)a  
 1920 1928 1930 1932A 1933 
SPD % Catholic -48 -66 -66 -66 -62 
% Blue-Collar  11  22  18  13  15 
% Self Employed -18 -44 -35 -41 -42 
% White Collar   6  23  23  31  31 
% Agrarian -14 -39 -36 -44 -48 
KPD % Catholic -07 -25 -21 -17 -26 
% Blue-Collar  29  59  66  71 69 
% Self Employed -26 -63 -68 -70 -69 
% White Collar   8  29  30  27  32 
% Agrarian -19 -57 -62 -63 -68 
Z/BVP % Catholic  92  92  93  93  93 
% Blue-Collar -16 -18 -24 -20 -14 
% Self Employed  23  24  30  25  17 
% White Collar -20 -22 -25 -21 -16 
% Agrarian  23  24  29  23  16 
DDP % Catholic -46 -47 -32 -35 -34 
% Blue-Collar -16 -15 -17 -15 -13 
% Self Employed   8 -12  -1 +/- 00 -11 
% White Collar  22  46  35  29  43 
% Agrarian -16 -39 -27 -22 -36 
DVP % Catholic -56 -50 -40 -28 -32 
% Blue-Collar  -3   8   9  -5  20 
% Self Employed -26 -32 -35 -14 -23 
% White Collar  39  41 39 35  40 
% Agrarian -37 -47 -45 -34 -44 
DNVP % Catholic -59 -43 -36 -47 -55 
% Blue-Collar -24 -22 -13 -21 -17 
% Self Employed  39  12  -3   3 +/- 00 
% White Collar -37 -14  -2   2   7 
% Agrarian  55  38  26  23  17 
NSDAP % Catholic - -09 -53 -71 -55 
% Blue-Collar - -13 -15 -36 -46 
% Self Employed -  11   9  46  59 
% White Collar -   5 -12 -42 -52 
% Agrarian -  -6   8  47  63 
a Values from Jürgen W. Falter, Thomas Lindenberger, and Siegfried Schumann, Wahlen und 
Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik (Munich, 1986), 163-70. For the rubric “Catholics,” 
bivariate correlation coefficient; all other rubrics, share of Catholics partialed out, that is, 
statistically controlled. 
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Table 3 displays two different types of correlation coefficients: normal bivari-
ate coefficients without controls for third variables and partial correlation coef-
ficients with a control for potentially disturbing factors such as the percentage 
of Catholics. Partial correlation coefficients should be interpreted as if the units 
of analysis, such as cities and counties, were more or less denominationally the 
same. This method controls for the factor of “religious denomination” when 
analyzing the influence of other social variables. Controlling the denomination-
al factor in this manner is necessary because the confessional cleavage was by 
far the most important factor influencing Weimar voting behavior. Its influence 
was so important that the effect of other variables correlating with religious 
denomination is often virtually suppressed by it. Since in Weimar Germany the 
percentages of Catholics and Protestants were nearly perfectly negatively cor-
related – that is, a high percentage of Catholics always implied a low percent-
age of Protestants, and vice versa – one should not use partial correlation coef-
ficients with controls for confession to determine the effect of religious 
denomination. In the case of the denominational variable, other potential influ-
ence factors are not statistically controlled. In the case of all other social varia-
bles, Table 3 deals with partial correlations with controls for the factor “Catho-
lics.”  
Table 3 reflects social characteristics that are of particular importance for 
the analysis of sociopolitical cleavages.17 It clearly shows the influence of at 
least three political cleavages acting upon the Weimar party system. In the first 
place, religious denomination undoubtedly separates the two Catholic parties 
from the other four parties. Only in the case of the KPD is the relationship very 
weak. A second line of cleavage is represented by the two variables “blue-
collar” and “self-employed.” In districts with more blue-collar workers and 
fewer self-employed persons than average, the share of the KPD vote and, to a 
somewhat lesser degree, that of the SPD are higher than average, whereas the 
shares of the other parties fall below their national mean. A third line of cleav-
age is represented at its positive pole by the percentage of the population work-
ing in the agrarian sector of the economy and at its negative pole by the per-
centage of white-collar workers and civil servants. In general, the DNVP in 
Protestant areas and the Center Party and BVP to a significantly lesser extent in 
Catholic areas were much more successful in mobilizing voters between 1928 
and 1933 wherever the percentage of those employed in the agrarian sector was 
higher than the national average. On the other hand, both the two socialist and 
the two liberal parties were significantly weaker than in the rest of the country 
in those areas that were predominantly agrarian in terms of their social and 
economic structures. Last, there was a fourth cleavage representing regional 
                                                             
17  For further social correlates of the party vote in Weimar Germany, see ibid. 
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and ethnic conflicts, but this was of only minor importance in the Weimar 
Republic and is not discussed here. 
It is clear that the confessional cleavage remained of major importance for 
the two Catholic parties until the very end of the Weimar Republic. The same 
is true in substance for the two socialist parties, especially for the SPD, and for 
the DNVP, all of which were clearly rooted in Protestant regions. Only for the 
two liberal parties, which virtually disappeared from the political stage between 
1928 and 1932, did the confessional cleavage seem to lose importance after 
1928. The same is true of the second cleavage, which was represented by the 
share of blue-collar workers in the general population. During the course of the 
Great Depression, however, a further line of division demarcated by the unem-
ployment rate arose within the blue-collar sector. According to the correlation 
coefficients in Table 3, this new division promoted the growth of the KPD, 
which more and more became the party of the unemployed.18 Finally, with 
regard to the third cleavage based upon the percentage of people employed in 
the agricultural sector, there was only a relatively minor change as far as most 
parties were concerned. Only the DNVP seems to have lost its strong social 
basis in the rural Protestant regions of Germany. The principal beneficiary of 
the DNVP’s decline after 1930 seems to have been the NSDAP, whose elec-
toral success in 1932 and 1933 was higher on average in those areas where the 
share of the Protestant rural population was high. 
Party Affiliation and Social Groups 
The coefficients in Table 3, as well as the interpretations based upon them, are 
not only derived from aggregate data but are restricted to the aggregate level. 
That is to say, the preceding section discusses only relationships between vari-
ables that existed at the level of the thousand or so counties throughout Germa-
ny in the Weimar Republic. The hypotheses in question, however, relate to the 
level of the individual. Such questions can only be answered on the basis of 
individual data, that is, information that is not collected at the level of the coun-
ties or cities but at the level of the individual voters. Once again, evidence 
restricts analysis to the extrapolation about individual voting behavior through 
the interpretation of aggregate data by means of multiple ecological regression 
analysis. Table 4 depicts the results of two such ecological regression analyses 
for three Reichstag elections. The starting point is the May 1924 election, be-
cause this was the first time that the NSDAP competed at the national level as a 
                                                             
18  See Jürgen W. Falter, “Unemployment and the Radicalisation of the German Electorate 
1928-1933: An Aggregate Data Analysis with Special Emphasis on the Rise of National So-
cialism,” in Peter Stachura, ed., Unemployment and the Great Depression in Weimar Germa-
ny (Basingstoke and London, 1986), 187-208. 
HSR Suppl. 25 (2013)  │  209 
junior partner of a völkisch coalition. Furthermore, the bipolar competition on 
the left between the SPD and the KPD took shape in this election. The second 
election under consideration is the Reichstag election of 1928, which may be 
regarded as the last normal election before the start of the Great Depression and 
the subsequent sudden rise of National Socialism from a right-wing extremist 
splinter group to the strongest party in Germany. Finally, the July 1932 Reichs-
tag election was chosen because in this election the NSDAP managed to win 
the highest share of the popular vote in a truly free election and emerged as by 
far the strongest party in the Reichstag.  
The percentages reported in Table 4 depict the probabilities of a Catholic 
and a non-Catholic or a member of the three social classes voting for one of the 
indicated parties at the three elections. Again, interpretation should be restrict-
ed to global orders of magnitude and should avoid over-interpreting small 
percentage differences.19 Even then, the confessional cleavage proves to have 
been extraordinarily durable, with Catholicism being a positive predictor for 
support for the Center Party and the BVP and negative for the SPD, the liber-
als, and the DNVP. Only for the KPD electorate does Catholic confessional 
identity seem to have been of minor importance.20 After 1928, the NSDAP was 
also a predominantly Protestant party that received disproportionately fewer 
Catholic votes. The data show that about 40 percent of all eligible Catholic 
voters opted for one of the two Catholic parties. Non-Catholics, on the other 
hand, gave almost no support to the Center Party and the BVP.21 In contrast, 
only 10 percent of the Catholics, but almost 30 percent of the non-Catholics 
voted in 1928 for parties of the bourgeois-Protestant bloc. 
The blue-collar vote also proved rather stable. About 40 to 45 percent of the 
eligible blue-collar workers seem to have voted in 1924 and 1932 for one of the 
two socialist parties; about 10 percent for the two Catholic parties; and between 
20 and 30 percent for one of the bourgeois parties, by far mostly for the 
NSDAP after 1930. According to the data and the statistical results, blue-collar 
support for the NSDAP came not from the electoral supporters of the two par-
                                                             
19  According to the formal characteristics of our statistical estimators, the results for the 
variable “confession” are probably better than those for the variable “social class.” Thus 
there are no estimators for the confessional variables that are negative or higher than 100. 
On the other hand, some estimators for social class are negative in sign. They were 
smoothed by means of proportional fitting. For technical details, see Jan-Bernd Lohmöller, 
et al., “Unemployment and the Rise of National Socialism,” in Peter Nijkamp, ed., Measuring 
the Unmeasurable (Dordrecht, 1985), 357-70. 
20  Here it is important to bear in mind that being a member of the Catholic church did not, at 
least in Germany, imply being a practicing Catholic. 
21  The figure of 40 percent is quite a high mobilization rate, since the social characteristic 
“Catholic” contains both practicing and nominal Catholics. Furthermore, we are reporting as 
dependent variables the party vote as well as nonvoting. For analogous estimates, see the 
contemporary source Johannes Schauff, Die deutschen Katholiken und die Zentrumspartei. 
Eine politisch-statistische Untersuchung der Reichstagswahlen seit 1871 (Cologne, 1928). 
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ties of the labor movement but mainly from former voters for the bourgeois-
Protestant bloc and from nonvoters. 22  
Table 4: The Party Vote of Major Social Groups 
 
Confession Social Class 
Catholic Other Blue Coll. White Coll. Self-Empl. 
SPD      
1924A  5 21 21 16  7 
1928  9 28 31 24  7 
1932A  6 23 22 24  7 
KPD      
1924A  9 10 19  5  0 
1928  5  9 14  5  0 
1932A 10 13 23  6  0 
Z/BVP      
1924A 43  2  9  9 27 
1928 37  0 10  8 17 
1932A 42  0 11 10 20 
DDP/DVP      
1924A  3 15  8 18 12 
1928  4 13  6 17 11 
1932A  1  2  1  3  2 
DNVP      
1924A  3 21 13 14 18 
1928  4 14  9 10 13 
1932A  2  6  4  6  6 
NSDAP      
1924A  3  6  4  7  6 
1928  2  2  2  2  2 
1932A 16 38 25 29 42 
Column percentages estimated by means of multiple ecological regression analysis. The empiri-
cal basis was the election results in 865 county units. See Jürgen W. Falter and Reinhard Zintl, 
“The Economic Crisis of the 1930’s and the Nazi Vote,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 19 
(1987/88): 55-85. 
Reading example: In May 1924, about 5 percent of the eligible Catholics and 21 percent of the 
non-Catholic population voted SPD. 
 
The two socialist parties attracted relatively few votes from the old middle 
class, self-employed artisans and shopkeepers, and the farming population. A 
relatively high percentage of the self-employed seemed to have voted for the 
Center or the BVP, whereas the Protestant members of the old middle class 
spread their vote among the various parties of the bourgeois-Protestant bloc. 
                                                             
22  In interpreting these estimates, one should take into consideration the fact that the blue-
collar category of the official Weimar statistics comprised not only industrial laborers but 
also workers from the agrarian and tertiary sectors who, as I have shown elsewhere, showed 
a much lower affinity for the socialist parties but seem to have voted more strongly in favor 
of National Socialism than the true blue-collar workers. See Jürgen W. Falter, Hitlers Wähler 
(Munich, 1991), ch. 7. 
HSR Suppl. 25 (2013)  │  211 
After 1930, the old middle class switched heavily to the NSDAP. From the 
perspective of the political blocs, the voting behavior of the old middle class 
followed traditional political cleavages more closely than that of blue-collar 
workers. 
In contrast to the old middle class, the voting behavior of the new middle 
class of white-collar employees and civil servants was much more differentiat-
ed and less directed by historical political divisions. Between 20 and 30 percent 
of those voters who belonged to the so-called new middle class opted regularly 
for one of the two left parties. After 1928 the SPD seems to have received more 
support from this stratum of society than from the blue-collar electorate. About 
40 percent of civil servants and white-collar employees voted for the parties of 
the bourgeois-Protestant bloc. After July 1932, the NSDAP collected the splin-
ters of this group, although support from the new middle class remained much 
lower than that from the old middle class. 
To summarize, the evidence of individual voter preferences shows that basic 
historical divisions of the German electorate characterized the electoral behav-
ior of the various social strata and religious groups right up to the end of the 
Weimar Republic. The changes that took place occurred mainly within the 
bourgeois-Protestant bloc. It is important to note that no single political bloc 
was able to mobilize all or even an absolute majority of the members of one 
social class or confession for its own purposes. Only within the old middle 
class did a majority vote for one of the parties of the bourgeois-Protestant bloc 
after 1930. The NSDAP succeeded in winning more partisans from this social 
stratum or class than from any other social group.  
The Social Composition of Party Electorates 
By examining the social composition of the voters for the various political 
parties rather than the tendency of the members of various social groups to 
identify themselves with those parties, it is possible once again to address the 
effect of the confessional cleavage: The Center party and its Bavarian counter-
part recruited almost all of their voters from the Catholic sector of the popula-
tion. In the other political blocs, with the exception first of the Communists and 
later of the National Socialists, Catholic voters represented an insignificant 
minority of the party electorates (Table 5). This pattern changed very little 
during the Weimar Republic. On the other hand, the division between blue-
collar workers and self-employed persons is clearly visible. Particularly the 
KPD seems to have been a clearly class-based blue-collar party, despite having 
a small white-collar following. The SPD constituency, however, was much 
more mixed: More than a third – and after 1930 more than 40 percent – of 
those who voted for the Social Democrats seem to have come from a middle-
class background, analogous to the social composition of the SPD members. 
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The other parties, especially the two liberal groups, recruited their voters from 
astonishingly equal proportions of blue-collar, white-collar, and self-employed 
voters. Both the DNVP and the NSDAP, on the other hand, had a surprisingly 
high share of blue-collar voters among their followers. Even here, however, the 
changes between 1924 and 1932 were of only minor importance. We may 
therefore concur with the thesis of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan 
that the political landscape of the Weimar Republic is characterized by the 
pronounced persistence of recruitment of voters from the same core clientele. 
Table 5: The Social Composition of the Weimar Party Electorates 
 
Confession Social Class 
Catholic Other Blue Coll. White Coll. Self-Empl. 
SPD      
1924A  9 91 65 21 14 
1928 13 87 65 21 13 
1932A 12 88 57 28 15 
KPD      
1924A 29 71 85 12  3 
1928 21 79 76 16  8 
1932A 28 72 81 13  6 
Z/BVP      
1924A 93  7 30 16 54 
1928 100  0 40 18 41 
1932A 99  1 38 18 43 
DDP/DVP      
1924A 10 90 34 34 33 
1928 13 87 33 33 33 
1932A 12 88 33 30 37 
DNVP      
1924A  6 94 41 19 39 
1928 11 89 41 20 39 
1932A 14 86 38 27 35 
NSDAP      
1924A 20 80 39 27 35 
1928 30 70 40 22 37 
1932A 17 83 39 19 42 
Row percentages estimated by means of multiple ecological regression analysis. Basis: 865 
county units. 
Reading example: In May 1924, about 90 percent of the SPD voters were non-Catholic, ap-
proximately two-third were blue-collar workers, 20 percent white-collar workers, etc. 
Conclusion 
The goal of the preceding analysis has been to reconstruct through ecological 
regression analysis and aggregate data analysis the movement of voters be-
tween parties and political blocs during the Weimar Republic and to gain new 
insights into the political affiliations of the important social groups and, from a 
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complementary perspective, into the social composition of the electorates of 
Weimar parties. The pronounced stability of electoral blocs at the national level 
is confirmed by a corresponding pattern of individual voter fluctuations. A 
strong majority of all voter shifts during the Weimar Republic were movements 
within specific electoral blocs. If one considers the NSDAP as part of the bour-
geois-Protestant bloc, then the average shift from one camp to another between 
elections amounted only to 20 to 30 percent, a figure rather close to modern 
fluctuation rates in the former Federal Republic of Germany. Fluctuations were 
significantly higher only among nonvoters, many of whom were in the process 
of switching parties and electoral blocs, and for the liberal and conservative 
parties, which in the first case was almost totally and in the second partially 
wiped out by the National Socialists. 
Despite a high rate of stability for the various electoral blocs that existed in 
the Weimar Republic, a significant shift of voters from the different blocs to 
the NSDAP could be detected during the last Reichstag elections. Both rela-
tively and absolutely, the parties of the bourgeois-Protestant bloc lost the most 
voters to the NSDAP, followed by the nonvoters and the socialist bloc. Almost 
half of the NSDAP electorate of March 1933 had voted for one of the various 
parties of the bourgeois-Protestant bloc, one-third came from nonvoters, and 
about 7 out of 100 came from the socialist bloc. 
Similarly, the cleavage structure of the Weimar Republic proved to be rather 
table. This was especially true for the confessional cleavage, which showed no 
significant variation at either the aggregate or the individual level between 
1920 and 1933. The effect of the second cleavage, between blue-collar workers 
and the self-employed, was similar. Almost none of the self-employed seem to 
have voted for the two socialist parties, which in turn recruited their support 
mainly from the blue-collar sector. On the other hand, all other political parties 
won an astonishingly high degree of blue-collar support. This is particularly 
striking with regard to the NSDAP electorate. It was socially much more heter-
ogeneous than most contemporary sociologists and modern historians have 
thought. Contrary to many expectations, the SPD also seems to have been 
socially heterogeneous. In this respect, the social composition of its electorate 
more or less mirrored that of its party membership. At the end of the Weimar 
Republic, the KPD was the only proletarian party with strong backing from 
unemployed voters. 
In contrast to the old middle class, the electoral behavior of the new middle 
class was quite differentiated and less clear-cut than has been presumed by 
many contemporaries and historians. Within the NSDAP electorate, the new 
middle class did not form a majority. It might even have been underrepresent-
ed. The non-Catholic self-employed, mostly from an agrarian background, 
voted largely for the National Socialists from 1930 on. Within the bourgeois-
Protestant bloc, the NSDAP constituted a kind of functional equivalent as the 
representative of the formerly liberal, conservative, and special interest-
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oriented groups. More than any other party of its time, it was a force that trans-
cended the cleavages that had become so deeply embedded in the German 
electorate, a factor that helps to explain its enormous surge at the electoral level 
between 1928 and 1932. 
Methodological Appendix: Data Base and Statistical Techniques 
Data Base: The empirical analysis in this essay is based on two data sets. The 
first was originally derived from the Inter-University Consortium for Political 
and Social Research (ICPSR) Weimar Election File.23 The second data set, 
containing fewer variables but a greater number of cases, carries information 
on the 4,000 to 5,000 German communities with more than 2,000 inhabitants. It 
contains about 200 variables, mainly electoral data for all Reichstag elections 
between 1920 and 1933 (with the unfortunate exception of the two 1932 elec-
tions) and some valuable social, economic, and sociocultural information on 
the community level.24 
Both data sets can be used for analytical purposes only if one adjusts the 
units for boundary changes, which occurred in Weimar Germany with consid-
erable frequency. Since these boundary changes did not follow a random pat-
tern but took place mainly in the more urbanized and economically active re-
gions of the nation, serious distortions result if one does not neutralize their 
effect when creating county or community units that are stable over time. This 
restriction is often overlooked or treated in a rather cavalier fashion in the 
existing literature on the Nazi vote.25 But without such adjustments, it is inad-
visable to combine census and election data from different years. After the 
necessary adjustments, the number of cases in the county data set shrank by 
over 25 percent, from about 1,200 to 865. Problems created by boundary 
                                                             
23  Since the ICPR Weimar Election File Data Set contains virtually thousands of minor and 
major errors, in the course of a large research project on the NSDAP voters we had to re-
construct our own county data set from scratch. For this purpose we used the relevant vol-
umes of Statistik des Deutschen Reiches (Berlin, 1920-34) plus a multitude of other printed 
sources, such as unemployment statistics, fiscal reports, and so forth. The county data set 
now contains about 700 variables, among them some 200 to 300 containing information on 
all Weimar Reichstag and presidential elections plus the referenda on the expropriation of 
the former ruling princes (Fürstenenteignung) and on the Young Plan concerning the pay-
ment of reparations. The rest of the variables are social, economic, and cultural indicators of 
the 1,200 counties of the Weimar Republic. 
24  The community data set is distributed by the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung. 
[Today: GESIS – Leibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences, Unter Sachsenhausen 6-8, 50667 
Cologne, Germany]. 
25  Some examples are discussed in Jürgen Falter and Wolf D. Gruner, “Minor and Major Flaws 
of a Widely Used Data Set: The ICPSR ‘German Weimar Republik Data 1919-1933’ under 
Scrutiny,” Historical Social Research 6 (1981) 4: 4-26. 
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changes are even more serious for community data files if one does not restrict 
the adjustment procedure to pairs of elections.26 
Research Techniques: Most hypotheses on the Nazi electorate imply indi-
vidual-level relations. This kind of information is not available for the Weimar 
period. The only data existing are aggregate data. As a result, we must rely on 
percentages of parties or social indicators that are available only on a county or 
community level. Using this information, we are able to specify, for example, 
that the NSDAP fared much better between 1930 and 1933 in Protestant than in 
Catholic counties, that there is a negative correlation between unemployment 
figures and the Nazi share of the vote, and that there is a strong association 
between the losses of the middle-class parties and the National Socialist vote 
gains. What we would like to know, however, is information such as the per-
centage of Catholics and non-Catholics voting NSDAP in 1930 and the share of 
unemployed blue-collar workers voting for Adolf Hitler between 1928 and 
1933. The most common yet seldom applied statistical technique to infer indi-
vidual-level data from aggregate data is ecological regression analysis.27 
Our analysis, as far as the individual level is concerned, is based on this 
technique. Unfortunately, ecological regression analysis works only if the data 
meet some rather strong statistical assumptions. Some of these assumptions 
(the standard assumptions of regression analysis such as linearity) can be tested 
by means of aggregate data. Other assumptions, including those that permit 
inference from aggregate to individual-level relations, cannot be tested by 
aggregate data alone or can be tested only under very special circumstances. 
The most important of these special assumptions of ecological regression anal-
ysis is that the slope of the regression line of each pair of variables under con-
sideration is the same between the individual units as it is between the aggre-
gate units; that is, no systematic contextual effects are permitted. Only random 
variation around the regression line is acceptable. From empirical evidence, we 
know that the assumption of non-contextuality is unrealistic in many instances. 
Therefore, it seemed reasonable to control our regression equations for poten-
tially disturbing factors such as confession or urbanization. We thus might be 
able to neutralize, at least in part, unwelcome nonlinearities. Our findings are 
based on such an extension of the classic ecological regression technique. Fur-
thermore, we weighted each county unit by its number of eligible voters in 
order to control for extreme variations in population. Finally, we applied a 
proportional fitting procedure to any negative estimators that arose since nega-
                                                             
26  For the same reason, the ecological regression analysis reported in Table 4 is based on such 
pairs of elections. The community data set, which in its raw form contains about 6,000 
communities (all communities with 2,000 inhabitants or more plus the county-based means 
for all communities with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants), is thus reduced to about 4,000 
community units. 
27  See Jan-Bernd Lohmöller and Jürgen W. Falter, “Some Further Aspects of Ecological Regres-
sion Analysis,” Quality and Quantity 20 (1986): 109-25. 
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tive percentages do not exist in reality.28 There is, however, no guarantee of the 
total elimination of bias from our findings. Our statistical approach is rational 
in that it is based on an explicitly statistical model and not simply on hindsight 
or on the straightforward inference from simple bivariate ecological correla-
tions or aggregate level regressions to individual-level relations. This differen-
tiates it from much of the existing research on the Nazi electorate.29 
                                                             
28  Although the transition probabilities for the elections between 1920 and 1928 were calcu-
lated on the basis of our Weimar Community Data Set without the use of control variables, 
the 1928 to 1933 transition probabilities, as well as the voting propensities of the two con-
fessions and the different social strata, were calculated on the basis of the 865 county units 
of our Weimar Republic County Data Set, using urbanization and religious denominations as 
control variables in order to neutralize possible contextual effects. For details, see Jan-Bernd 
Lohmöller et al., “Unemployment and the Rise of National Socialism: Contradicting Results 
from Different Regional Aggregations,” in Peter Nijkamp, ed., Measuring the Unmeasurable 
(Boston, 1985), 357-70. Negative estimators or values above 100 were squeezed into the 0-
100 percent interval by an iterative proportional fitting procedure. 
29  For those who feel uncomfortable with this methodology, some aggregate correlations and 
regression coefficients are reported in Jürgen W. Falter, “The National Socialist Mobilization 
of New Voters,” in Thomas Childers, ed., The Formation of the Nazi Constituency, 1919-1933 
(London, 1986), 202-31; idem, “Der Aufstieg der NSDAP in Franken bei den Reichstagswah-
len 1924-1933,” German Studies Review 9 (1986): 293-318; and, most recently, idem, Hit-
lers Wähler (Munich, 1991). 
